The Weakening of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Measuring U.S. Security and Nuclear Weapons Policies

Abstract

In sum, the NPT has been corrupted and destroyed by some of its own provisions, by the arbitrariness of its implementation, and by the lack of good faith on the part of the nuclear weapons states to achieve complete nuclear disarmament, as required. While the NPT and CTBT provide important components to nuclear disarmament, it is clear that treaties are not enough when the powerful that must obey them want to subvert their intent. This is because the nuclear weapon states have come to see their security, their power, and their position in the world as being linked to the possession and deployment of nuclear weapons. The NPT is one example where the United States rejected a treaty whose goal was to enhance security in favor of its own measures. We see in this trend a shift away from the desire to participate as an equal in the rule of law on a global scale. The U.S seeks to reinterpret the NPT as legitimizing the possession of weapons by existing nuclear states while using it as the justification for confronting other states accused of proliferation. The U.S. has an attitude of 'do-as-we-say-not-as- we-do* in dealing with the nuclear proliferation in the world. With the Bush Doctrine, it seems that coercive diplomacy can in the extreme become a policy of counterproliferation. Such acts however would not be considered by most of the world as part of the normal and acceptable approaches to nonproliferation and may be considered acts of aggression.